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On Ethnographic Sincerity
by John L. Jackson Jr.
This essay posits sincerity and humor as linked ways of politicizing the interactions that underpin
all ethnographic encounters. This politicization is contrasted with conventional anthropological preoccupations with authenticity (and fetishizations of ethnographic writing), and it demands attention
to the human bodies that constitute ethnographic intersubjectivity. Combining a discussion of Habermas’s public sphere with the exploits of a nineteenth-century African American mesmerist and
protoanthropologist, Paschal Randolph, I argue against one kind of “occulted anthropology” (the
disembodied version attributed to Habermas) for an agential variety exemplified by Randolph’s
differently framed investments in the political powers of occultist possibility. Instead of being seduced
by would-be objective attempts to access a disembodied (i.e., universal) subjectivity, I argue for a
Paschal-like reclamation of the vulnerable ethnographic body (in all of its contingent particularity),
a reclamation that fuses rational minds to laughing bodies while opening up space for a critique of
potentially impoverished conceptualizations of politics and political activity.

It was anthropologist Carolyn Rouse who most recently reminded me to think more substantively about the analytical
dangers that arise from downplaying the heuristic importance
of humor. We were on a panel at an American Anthropological Association (AAA) meeting, and she was talking about
ethnographies that made her laugh, productively and profoundly, even when treating ostensibly tragic or disturbing
topics. Her point resonated with many in the room. Hazards
and lacunae emerge when ethnographers underestimate the
extent to which humanity’s existential difference is constituted, at least in part, by our uncanny ability to find the
smallest incongruous comedic pathway through even the most
horrific of life situations, a capacity hinted at and colloquialized in the vernacular adage about laughing to keep from
crying.1 However, this is not just laughter as a mechanism for
repression and strategic amnesia, although that clearly gets
bundled into what the aforementioned phrase implies. The
laughter Rouse was invoking also indicates a kind of vulnerable and vernacular pleasure that ethnographic accounts can
document, a pleasure that pivots on people’s stubborn recognition of their own continued worth despite external threats
of devaluation and marginalization—maybe even because of
those threats. Antaeus, the Libyan giant of Greek mythology,
epitomized a physicalization of this paradoxical endowment,
seeming only the stronger in battle each time his opponent
slammed his body down into the earth.
A call for the methodological utility of humor—for a mu-

tually beneficial analytics and politics of the ludic—demands
that ethnographies do more than just “break your heart,” a
differently compelling mandate offered up by Ruth Behar
(1997). Ethnographic work might also actively solicit a kind
of compassionate and empathetic guffaw at the many ways
in which people hold fast to a sense of robust selfhood, fending off the potentially dehumanizing slide into an anguished
and pathological embrace of one-dimensional victimhood.
The intersubjectivity that constitutes ethnography’s experiential core is a fecund space for thematizing and recalibrating
the political implications of fieldwork-based research predicated on cultivation of an intimate relatedness that is only
vulgarized with apolitical euphemisms about “building rapport.” What is this “rapport,” which George Marcus (1998)
famously conceptualized as “complicity,” and what are its
politics? Might that be one of the first things anthropology
reexamines when assessing its own discipline-based social and
political engagements?
Anthropology has become fiendishly self-reflexive, a trait
heightened and refined with the “writing culture” moment
of the 1980s and 1990s, when anthropologists and their critics
laid bare the various rhetorical strategies used to produce
certain kinds of textual authority. Even though the ramifications of these deconstructive gestures sought to engage the
methodological and epistemological totality of the ethnographic experience, the discursive endgame of the finished
monograph (maybe a too-easy and reified prey) was pedes-
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1. Erve Chambers (1989) compares ethnography to comedy in a fairly
systematic way. His work emphasizes the formal/structural similarities
between the two genres as opposed to highlighting their substantive and
necessary cross-fertilizations.
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talized for subsequent toppling—over and against a more
sustained set of conversations about the quotidian, affectladen, and ethical demands of working as an ethnographic
data gatherer. Of course, “the field” was constantly invoked
and theorized, mostly as trope and mystification, the messiness of which was deemed flattened out and papered over by
the conventional narratologics of ethnographic writing. The
discipline has done a sophisticated job, in my opinion, of
thinking through the politics of cultural representation, and
that discourse/practice continues to push the traditional limits
of our writerly genre in productive, challenging, and sometimes wonderfully frustrating ways. But I want to offer up a
very preliminary and schematic discussion of what I am calling “ethnographic sincerity” to suggest the ethicopolitical purchase of focusing an analytical eye on potential problems that
accrue from underthematizing the substantive (seemingly extraethnographic) relationships forged between anthropologists and the anthropologized.2 I want to begin an argument
that labels such ethnographic contact a kind of epistemological ground zero for engagements with the politics of anthropological knowledge production today.
It has become cliché to invoke the politics (not to mention
the ethics) of participant observation, anthropology’s quintessential methodological gesture; its inadequacies and mystifications are far too ripe for justifiable picking, especially
given common stereotypes (fair or not) about the discipline’s
traditional unwillingness, formally and systematically, to train
graduate students in ethnographic methods. Even as late as
the mid-1990s, when I was just starting graduate school,
would-be cultural anthropologists were taught to envision
fieldwork as a kind of trial by fire, a rite of passage you did
not prepare for so much as simply endure and survive, on
the fly and by the seat of your pants. We registered for mandated courses that required us to write research proposals
delineating our game plan for “the field” and linking our
immersion in a particular geographical locale to a set of questions, concerns, and theories that might help us to explain
what about that place was important to think (and think
with). But we did not really operationalize or theorize the
pending methodological moment much more than that. How
could we? Each student would plop down in such a decidedly
distinctive political, cultural, social, and environmental landscape. The experience of fieldwork would be an unpredictable
cocktail that only became the more capricious when combined
with the idiosyncrasies and psychologies of all the individuals
involved: dissertators conducting their research and the various research subjects asked to suffer our foolishness.
2. Fran Markowitz and Michael Ashkenazi (1999) compiled an important anthology of anthropological negotiations of sexuality in the field
that speaks to one of these seemingly extraethnographic (because bracketed out of most monographs) themes. Bill Maurer (2005) uses the notion
of “post reflexivity” to talk about a kind of ethnography that cares less
about deconstructing its own authority claims and more about dealing
with the field’s bounce-back/constructive powers of interpellating the
anthropologist.
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When my students today ask me to parse the difference
between urban anthropology and qualitative sociology, especially if ethnographic researchers from those two disciplines
are working in the same locations and on ostensibly comparable issues, I sometimes (purposefully provocatively) chalk
the actual distinction up to discrepancies in how the two
domains approach the ethnographic project itself, our respective assumptions about methodological rigor and validity.
We both can “do” ethnography, but the differences are striking. And we see some of that quite conspicuously on the
printed page—in the difference, say, between sociological appendixes that take us through a step-by-step unfurling of the
conceptual and methodological maneuvers of the sociological
researcher and an anthropological privileging of textual offerings that can sometimes make the methodological backstage (the “who,” “how many,” and “for how long” kinds of
questions) tenaciously murky, a technique for both enthroning “theory” and concomitantly protesting, at least orthogonally, more obvious and positivist genuflections to the superiority of bench sciences and their representational
conventions.
We can see that same sociological/anthropological difference on just about every single page of most monographs,
and that presentational distinction is a valuable weapon in
ongoing attempts at interdisciplinary policing. It might sound
unfair, indeed even ludicrous, but I want to claim that some
of these disciplinary differences are a function of the fact that
anthropology is a potentially more hopeful (or, even better,
more hope-filled) disciplinary formation than sociology, using
“hope” in ways that lean heavily on Vincent Crapanzano’s
(2003) attempt to thematize hope as a powerful analytical
rubric for reimagining ethnographic possibility.
In distinguishing desire from hope, while conceding their
ongoing and sloppy (if somewhat understandable) conflation
in the literature, Crapanazano notes social theory’s relative
underappreciation of hope. It is too cagey, protean, ephemeral, and autonomous to be domesticated into the kinds of
notions that provide anthropological theorists with conventional forms of would-be certainty or predictability. “In its
worldly manifestations,” he writes, “[hope] may be quite specific, edging on desire, as when a lawyer hopes to win a case
or a father hopes to have a daughter. Or it may be openended, lacking final definition, vague . . . and subject to
chance” (Crapanazano 2003:7). Its semantic expansiveness is
an asset that for some only serves to spoil the anthropological
project. Furthermore, there is the inescapably seductive danger of “false hope,” against which Crapanzano calculates true
hope as a fusion of realism with “social change, progress, and
even revolution.”
My reading of sincerity (and its ethnographic significances)
would wire questions of realism and political possibility to
Crapanzano’s ambitious reclamation of hope as a valuable
anthropological rubric. It is a version of this hope that allows,
I would argue, for that laughter in the face of calamity that
Rouse demands. We are talking about the importance and
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inescapable ordinariness of affect, something central to an
ethnographic praxis that is always funny and traumatic, poignant and mundane—all in the selfsame instant. It emphasizes some of how anthropologists and their informants embody an equally affective subjecthood during the ethnographic
encounter. “The politics of ordinary affect,” writes Kathleen
Stewart, “can be anything from a split second when police
decide to shoot someone because he’s black and standing in
a dark doorway and has something in his hands, to a moment
when someone falls in love with someone else who’s just come
into view. Obviously, the differences matter. The politics of
any surge depends on where it might go. What happens”
(Stewart 2007:15). This might move us to examine “what
happens” (and/or does not) when the ethnographic sparks
start flying in the intersubjective collision that is anthropological research, an anthropology that defines its difference
from most other versions of the social scientific enterprise (at
least in their overly scientistic iterations) as marking time
between a version of ethnography seen as a transparent window into a discrete, passive, and objective social world and
a contrasting variety considered something more like a black
box of feedback loops, inter/subjective contaminations, and
almost unteachable artistry. This is an anthropology that no
longer just flies headlong into the delusional fantasy of political self-evidence and clarity. Instead, it tries to heed Virginia
Dominguez’s call to rescue anthropology from its growing
political irrelevance by paying particular “attention to the
presence or absence of love and affection in our scholarship—
at all stages in the production of our scholarship” (Dominguez
2000:388).
My too-quick leaps (of faith?) from hope to affect to love
are all gestures in the direction of grounding a conceptual
distinction between sincerity and authenticity, two related
lenses for spotting “the real” and its varying implications for
ethnographic research. That “writing culture” moment privileged “authenticity” as a Trojan horse for falsified renditions
of ethnographic authority, which necessitates that we ask ourselves “what happens” when we move our discussion of realism’s stakes from authenticity to its “cognate ideal,” as Trilling once put it, sincerity. What do we gain, and what do we
lose? And why does this differential potential offer a drastically
newfangled commitment to “the political” in anthropology
today? To begin an admittedly incomplete answer to that
overly ambitious question, I am going to leave the contemporary moment, this version of the ethnographic present, for
a digression through the affect-laden and hope-saturated in/
sincerities of an African American protoanthropologist from
the mid-nineteenth century, Paschal Randolph.3
Paschal Beverly Randolph was a self-educated African
American born in downtown Manhattan in 1825. He was
raised on a patch of what was then a teeming, soot-filled slum
3. For much of my biographical information on the under-studied
Randolph, I use his own writings and the useful biography written by
John Patrick Deveney (1997).
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known as Five Points, where several of the city’s most dangerous and sometimes bloody streets intersected. Not at all
atypical for the time period, Randolph’s mother died of cholera when he was only 6 years old (during the epidemic of
1831), and the story of his father, of “the Virginia Randolphs,”
seems to have been made up by Paschal himself out of little
more than wishful dreams.
Despite his humble and poverty-stricken beginnings, by 1855
Randolph was a world-renowned transatlantic sex magician
who practiced alchemy, numerology, and various forms of astral
projection. He also represented an early, preinstitutionalized
version of American ethnography. His mid-nineteenth-century
research trips through Western Europe, Egypt, and the Turkish
Empire netted him powerful fetish objects and potent talismans: magic mirrors that one magnetized for clairvoyance
(to gaze into the future or the past) by carefully ejaculating
on their surfaces; hashish that Randolph personally mobilized
to free himself from earlier “slavery” under the negatively
“vampiric” powers of spirit mediumship; a variety of crystals,
magnets, and newly learned meditative techniques that allowed practiced men to engage in sexual intercourse for seemingly extraordinary amounts of time, techniques he sold
through the mail as part of his “sex science” system—and for
approximately five dollars a secret.
Historians of religion have characterized the rise of occultism (i.e., mesmerism, animal magnetism, etc.) in nineteenthcentury America as an instantiation of “the flight from
reason,” a time of increasingly irrational commitments to
mysticism and superstition (as a function, at least in part—
and somewhat ironically—of advances in scientific technology). But I am particularly interested in the political service
to which sex magic, spiritualism, and even (to a different
extent) occultism were put by the likes of Randolph, mediums
who channeled historical figures such as Benjamin Franklin,
John Adams, Martin Luther, and Socrates in aid to the abolitionist cause, these long-dead spirits deployed to rail against
the injustices of racial slavery and female disenfranchisement.
Even after Randolph denounced and recanted spiritualism
(which, he claimed, evacuated his soul and individual subjectivity in the name of “uncontrollably foreign forces”) and
began the occultist search he would bequeath to the likes of
Madame Blavatsky, of Theosophical Society fame, his continued use of magic/mediumship as a civil and political tool in
debates about the future of the nation-state, law, and governance were clear examples of the extent to which “the public
sphere” was soaked through and through with more than just
finely sifted Habermasian hyperrationalities. According to
Russ Castronovo (2001), nineteenth-century America’s farfetched, pseudoscientific, and illogical politicking (the kind
that Randolph exemplified) was actually more in line (not
less) with Habermas’s irredeemably abstract definitions of
civic engagement and its privileging of disembodied and passively immaterial citizen subjects—“human beings pure and
simple,” as Habermas put it, without a trace of the confusingly
salient social baggage that comes with actual embodied po-
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litical existence (i.e., sexualization, racialization, class-based
differentiation, etc.). Indeed, Habermas’s public sphere was
always what Castronovo labels an “occult public sphere,” demanding members to embrace a form of humanity stripped
of everything that gives social intercourse its specificity and
value.
The common caricatures we proffer of Habermas and the
forms of sociality that he conceived as being birthed from a
thoroughly modern public sphere are inadequate models of
political subjectivity/possibility. We often invoke a Habermas
who glimpsed the emergence of the modern public sphere in
European coffee houses about a century before Randolph first
journeyed there, a public sphere supposedly enabled by capital
and ordered by principles of rationality and articulate debate.
Habermas envisioned a civil conversation hostile to statusbased authorities, immune to irrationalities and unfalsifiable
claims, purged of groundlessly unexamined or superstitious
beliefs. Of course, many scholars have argued that an irrational sophism and exclusionism (far more pronounced than
Habermas recognized) has fundamentally overdetermined the
public sphere as a discursive and political space, but Castronovo’s wrinkle also emphasizes the degree to which Habermas himself constructs a public sphere that sneaks occultlike properties and priorities through the back doors of
those very same eighteenth-century coffeehouses.
Randolph was a follower of more famous clairvoyants and
spiritualists, such as Andrew Jackson Davis and John Murray
Spear, people who combined mesmerism and Swedenborgianism into a spiritualist practice complete with séances, automatic writing, spirit channeling, crystal gazing, and other
techniques for communicating with the deceased. This included spirit photography, a nineteenth-century method for
documenting and capturing communiqués between the living
and the dead. Indeed, technology itself was always folded into
the spiritualist cause. Magnetism and electrification were usually the motifs of choice—and more than just metaphorically.
Mesmerism harnessed magnetic and electrical forces, the newest discovered technologies and units of power, for access to
faraway temporal (not just spatial) distances.
The process of communicating with dead spirits (whether
photographed or not) was considered—according to cultural
historian Jeffrey Sconce (2000)—a kind of spiritual telegraphy: the telegraph was then a new and seemingly magical
device used to help Americans talk with one another across
vast geographical distances. And the deployment of science
(electricity, magnetism, physics, biology, etc.) served as backbone to the new media then undergirding claims for spiritualism’s scientific legitimacy. It only took photography about
10 years to hitch itself to the spiritualist bandwagon, and by
the mid-1880s, photography was being institutionalized in
parts of Europe as a genre of transparently self-evidential fact
in legal proceedings even as mesmerist, spiritualists, and magnetists used the same photochemical principles to capture the
ephemeral movement of spirits and their smoky auras (Tagg
1993). And this distinction was always couched as a difference
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between fact and fiction, science and hucksterism, (false)
hopes and in/sincerities always dangling in the balance: spiritual photographers reduced to insincere frauds preying on
the naive hopefulness of the living.
The history of photography has wended itself around this
paradox between its seemingly iconic/indexical properties and
its more fancifully artificial/rhetorical rendering powers. Theorist Roland Barthes (1981) offered up one of the most interesting musings on the inextricable linkages between photography and magicality even as he further canonizes the
medium’s claim to self-evidential and transparent “proofing,”
of authenticating “what was there” over and against the constructedness of artistic “representation.” Barthes famously distinguishes the studium (obvious and conspicuous aspects of
what any photograph indexically and objectively captures, including cultural contexts informing the material culture depicted in the image) from the more romantic and subjective
(and privileged) punctum of a photographic image, which he
likens to a wounding and pricking of the viewer by that invisible (and repressed) ultimate signified of all photographs:
death itself. This is a punctum that almost always seems to
emerge, unpredictably, from the photographs themselves, as
though a product of their own volition mixed with the idiosyncratic subjectivities of specific viewers. In some ways,
according to Barthes, all photographs are spirit photographs.
No matter what they ostensibly depict (the embrace of lovers,
a tractor in a field, children playing soccer), they are really
just showing us death, the dead, and ourselves as always already dead. They are little more than pictorial archives of our
own existential impermanence.
Barthes actually wants to have it both ways: photographs
as a magical and “private reading” (looking at a photo, he
says, is always a personal viewing) as well as a factual authentication of that which was—that which has been. Even
though such an assessment still traffics in realist assumptions
about photography’s ontological solidity, these same assumptions allow the image to signal our own pending doom. (For
Barthes, it is the image of his own dead mother staring back
at him as her preadolescent self.) We are already looking at
a ghost, seeing death, spying a reminder of our own too-soon
demise. No matter what the studium of the picture ostensibly
showcases, it is always, simply, us watching our own obliteration, something like that time-traveling guinea pig in Chris
Marker’s 1963 film La jetée, the one who as a child witnesses
himself getting killed as an adult—an image he cannot get
out of his head, even before he finally deciphers its true profundity. This marking of death, according to Barthes, is an
unflinching fact as inescapable and self-contained as the
sixteenth-century double-ledger bookkeeping that Mary
Poovey (1998) argues is equally a function of discursive force
and self-delusion (not just simplistically self-evident and undisputable numerical truths about the economic world of hard
and fast material items existing beyond the bounds of the
ledger’s carefully handled pages).
Randolph does not seem to have been an avid practitioner
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of spirit photography, but he did consider his sperm-soaked
magic mirrors “a sensitive surface upon which the attendant
dead could, can and do, temporarily photograph whatever
they choose to.” If talking to the dead was explicitly considered telegraphy, even Randolph’s magic mirrors could be understood as would-be photographic surfaces for mechanical
reproduction of the spiritual realm, a space wherein the hyperagential occultist and protoanthropologist conjures up the
disembodied other.
Photographs also provide a suggestive example for parsing
the conceptual distance between authenticity and sincerity as
analytically useful categories. For most people (other than
Barthes, perhaps), it would seem odd and illogical to call a
photograph sincere or insincere. They might consider the
photographer or the photographed medium sincere or insincere (depending, say, on whether they genuinely believe in
the veracity of their captured imagery or are more cynically
exploiting trickery for monetary gain and public notoriety).
However, the inanimate pictures themselves are less obviously
capable of such self-conscious subterfuge. If anything, the
sincerity of the people involved (photographers, photographed subjects, and even third parties sizing up the finished
product) is assumed to authenticate or deauthenticate the
photographs either as genuine reflections of spiritual communications, spirits leaving their photographic likeness on a
rickety séance table, or as purposeful/inadvertent effects of a
camera operator tampering with the celluloid.
Though tethered in some fundamental ways, the in/authenticity of the photograph and the in/sincerity of the photographer translate into a cavernous agential divide. When
Paschal, for one, turns his back on spiritualism (or a version
of it) in the 1850s, it is precisely because he wants to defend
himself from the inanimateness of mere photographs, from
being spiritually and subjectively evacuated, rendered nonconscious, left empty and open for another agential being
(from another dimension) to control. In fact, he claims to
have spent much of the first half of his entire life under the
thumb of hostile spiritual entities, a somatic automaton unable to refuse the bidding of powerful others.4 As a response
to that spiritual enslavement, his form of occultism emphasized the active and purposeful use of magic forces as opposed
to just mediumship/self-thingification. Randolph justified renunciation of his prior spiritualist practices by maintaining
that he did not want to be reduced to a receptacle for others’
subjectivities, a mere predication, a different version of Peter
Schwenger’s tear-filled thing (2006), just a photographesque
reflection of another’s reality.
4. Randolph was one of the first to propagate the occultist idea that
there are not just dead people’s souls out there waiting to dialogue with
mortals; there are other beings, he argued, “passing” for dead people,
taking over mediums like Randolph, and sometimes controlling them
even if the medium ostensibly is not in trance. That, Randolph says, is
what happened to him during the entire first half of his career, helping
to explain (he says) his infamous reputation as odd, unpredictable, and
angular.
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Randolph was far too proactive for that. He spent the Civil
War agitating for abolition (even if he sometimes seemed to
challenge more radical stances on the matter held by the likes
of Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison, both duly
impressed by Randoph’s intellect and rhetorical abilities). The
Civil War, of course, saw a major uptick in spirit photography
because people wanted to speak to dead relatives—especially
those soldiers killed in battle. And they also wanted to see
them, to take one last look at their dead. For Randolph, the
end of the Civil War was also an important watershed moment. He used the era’s newfound potential (and racial optimism) to segue from spiritualism to more mundane (and
this-worldly) exploits (before his subsequent occultist turn),
moving to New Orleans and teaching newly freed slaves to
read and write—that is, until wealthy Creoles drummed him
out of town for his odd Christianity, a version still steeped
in Randolph’s desire to fend off external forces threatening
to deny him agency.
To talk about the politics of ethnographic writing in terms
of authenticity alone, I want to argue, is akin to dehumanizing
and thingifying the ethnographic project/subject. It debases
and vulgarizes the ethnographic encounter itself, concocting
an occult intersubjectivity wherein the denied coevalness that
characterizes our field’s traditional discursive offerings ironically functions as a more accurate temporal architecture for
a form of vampirism that would deny the mutually cathected
ethnographic moment its due. This reduces the people we
work with—sometimes even as political allies—into political
objects no less inert for their ventriloquized placeholding as
reflections of others’ ethnographic and ideological interests.
An attempt to remember the significance of laughter, love,
and the everydayness of affect is an important methodological,
epistemological, and political intervention, a differently animated ghost in the ethnographic machine. To talk about the
ethnographic value of sincerity along with authenticity is to
poke and prod at our field’s undertheorizing of research methods and procedures during ongoing anthropological debates
about “the real.”
This is not just a way to say that “building rapport” is a
euphemism for lying and misrepresentation, for dissimulation
and insincerity. The stakes of sincerity rely on more than just
exposing Malinowskian monographs for their bracketed-out
xenophobia (Malinowski 1967). Clearly, sincerity is a multipronged aspect of Derek Freeman’s revisitation of Margaret
Mead’s work in Samoa; his criticism of Mead’s findings and
the scholarly challenges to his critiques are good reminders
of the secrets, subterfuges, and suppressions (what Diane Nelson would call “duplicities”) that function as inescapable scaffolding for any ethnographic edifice (Freeman 1999; Mead
1973). But that is not why sincerity is key. David Stoll’s (1999)
controversial exposure of Guatemalan activist Rigoberta Menchú’s autobiographical embellishments pivot on some of the
same vulnerable ground as do the accusations against Chagnon’s supposed political complicities in South America
(Tierney 2000) and the exposure of Project Camelot’s cold
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war efforts (Horowitz 1967; Price 2008). All of these are moments when purported sincerities (of everyone involved, including whistle-blowers and revisionists) are clearly at stake,
but an emphasis on sincerity is also about recognizing that
the other sees us coming and confounds us, sometimes with
the very same tools ethnographers use. Indeed, the intersubjective space of ethnographic encounters today is almost always a Rilesian “inside-out” moment: the academic researcher
finds research subjects that are already researching themselves
and, increasingly, researching us, too (Riles 2001).
The canonized Geertzian (Geertz 1973) distinction between
twitches, winks, and fake winks can be productively read as
further highlighting the analytical purchase of sincerity (especially on the part of those winking and fake-winking informants). For Geertz, thick description gets us from wink
to fake wink, which helps us to expose the native’s funny
bone—so that the anthropologist appreciates the subtlety of
a joke that might already be a “burlesqued burlesqued” wink
(Boon 2000:436), something potentially lost on the humorless
ethnographer. But that thickness is also a function of how
multiply saturated, how affected such an encounter is for
everyone—the anthropologist trying to change the world (one
ethnographic landscape at a time) and the informant, sometimes attempting to do the same (while negotiating the pluses
and minuses of having a seemingly well-intentioned anthropological interloper looking over her shoulder).
Anthropologists still teach their students about “primitives”
who look quite skeptically (even horrifyingly) at the camera’s
blinding flash, a flash that is imagined to literally “confine”
the spirit of the subject being captured on film. What reclaiming a marginalized figure like Randolph demands, à la
Fatimah Tobing Rony’s (1996) theory of minoritarian countervisualization, is that we look at our ethnographic practice
with a “third eye”—a seeing that imagines the power of ethnography (like photography) to rely less on overcommitments
to ethnography as self-evidential indexicality (one seductive
way to increase our field’s political relevance and profile in a
world that values the assumed hardness of science) and more
on a notion of fieldwork that counters anthropology’s traditional ability to turn our interlocutors into mediums, passive receptors for the discipline’s cultural constructions. We
should cultivate a healthy fear of ethnography and its tooeasy obviousness, its taken-for-granted transparency. What
gets devalued in our discipline when authenticity stands as
the only way to spy the “real”? What deformed notion of
valuation do we champion when the very nature of the ethnographic encounter is bracketed from discussions of anthropology’s political import? What “dismal science” does
anthropology become when it fails to truly interrogate the
political coefficients of its first-order interaction/s with “the
other” in the field, when the knowledge culled (or the political
structure reified or railed against) distracts ethnographers
from much of what constitutes human specificity? Instead of
just talking about native forms of “gift exchange,” let us also
theorize (not just thematize) the many gifts that we give and
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receive, ethnographic exchanges that grease the wheels of ethnographic knowledge transmission (Jackson 2005). These are
gifts that produce the very possibility of data acquisition and
political praxis in an ethnographic context. They are specific
and tangible, categorizable and individual—like the bodies of
those giving and receiving them.
Clearly, anthropologists must feel that they have bigger fish
to fry in the face of the hegemon that is a global “neoliberal
dispensation,” a moment when the privileged form of “political” freedom seems crammed into the singular God-given
right to consume—and, for the very poor, to imagine future
consumptive possibility. But just as postmodernism (somewhat counterintuitively) might be said to anticipate (and clear
the way for) neoliberalism’s master narrative and hyperreductionism, so too might we consider the inconspicuous rafters of any ethnographic interaction to be a staging area for
the kinds of Faustian pacts with unfreedom that allow institutionalized disciplines to have their political cake and eat it
too.5
There is, of course, a politics to building rapport, and it
implies more than just the negligible cost of doing ethnographic business as usual. The experiential practice of participant observation and its discursive congealment, the ethnographic monograph, combine to produce what Eve
Sedgwick (2003) might call a “periperformative” mix that
aspires to describe a social landscape while simultaneously
producing a node of politically charged intercultural contact
that is the enabling “ethnofiction” for anthropological attempts at political interventionism of any sort: tackling whatever aspect of “modern blackness” might account for what
transforms a peaceful hillside community into a space of hyperviolence (Thomas, forthcoming); arguing for a version of
Islamic subjectivity that can confound stereotypical Western
conceptions of ethnic/political difference (Varzi 2006); offering an ethnographic rendition of environmental racism’s dangers and southerners’ organized responses to such threats
(Checker 2005). In all of these instances and the many more
anthropologists negotiate, there is a need to think through
that moment of contact itself (an anthropologist and a murder
victim’s widow, an anthropologist and an Iranian filmmakermartyr, an anthropologist and a community activist, etc.), not
to cultivate the kind of solipsistic and metaethnographic
navel-gazing the discipline gets lampooned for producing.
Instead, it is about recognizing that the anthropologist is always a political actor in the everydayness of her practice (in
a way that demands unpacking and explicit articulation) each
and every time she sits at a community board meeting,
watches a local rally, or asks the most idle of clarifying ques5. This evocative connection between neoliberalism and postmodernism is compellingly marked by Graeber (2001). And bell hooks (1992)
has one of the most evocative and oft-cited discussions of “eating the
other” outside of anthropological engagements with the literality and
metaphoricity of cannibalism.

Jackson On Ethnographic Sincerity

tions. The unit of analysis is not the anthropologist but instead
the collision she is a part of—whether intended or not.
Sincerity, which I have defined (in other contexts) as a
category of existentially inescapable doubt only retroactively
coated with too-easy certainties (a self-delusional reading of
the other’s purported insides/intentions), is a way to flag
the kinds of potential dissimulations and duplicities that
always map our fears of betrayal, uneasiness, and confusion
across the ethnographic axis that links, however temporarily,
informant and anthropologist. To highlight the sparks that
fly from such seemingly ephemeral and quotidian (and obvious) social relations that open up space for anthropological knowledge production is usually understood as a postmodernly depoliticizing act, reflexivity as an excuse for
political inactivity. What manner of irresponsibility and selfaggrandizement would allow an anthropologist to obsess
over the intersubjective discomforts and disconnections
hovering beneath the surface of a seemingly necessary ethnographic encounter with, say, human rights activists putting the pieces back together in Darfur? Not to mention the
fact that such matters of interpersonal angst and uneasiness
are considered more rightly the province of psychology.
However, I want to make a case (still, admittedly, somewhat
half baked) for the anthropological social critic whose engagement with the world begins by treating other subjects/
informants more robustly as fully embodied and affective
interlocutors even when the ostensible stakes of the fieldwork we conduct seem so urgent. Anything else risks operationalizing and institutionalizing a form of political engagement within the discipline of anthropology that would
already be cut off at the experiential knees. Anthropologist
Saba Mahmood (2005) makes an argument for how shallow
definitions of “the political” (i.e., Western conceptions of
female agency mobilized as a universalist analytic for understanding Muslim women’s commitments to Islam) deprive others of true agency by dismissing their choices as
ideological brainwashing operating at cross-purposes to
their true interests.6 Of course, this is the quintessentially
ethnographic move, challenging the hubris of those who
would offer their peculiar cultural predilections as universal
facts from a precultural realm. To be a critical citizen of a
shrinking global world is to heed this deconstructionist call,
especially given our increased exposure to cultural difference
and to powerful claims for normativity that would dress
those cultural mandates in nature’s too-tight clothing.
As someone who uses anthropology to think critically
about race/racism, I am also convinced that deconstruction
alone will not provide us with much political traction. We
can win the polite public debates about “race” and demand
it be labeled a social construction (and the AAA’s current
traveling exhibit does quite a bit to further popularize that
6. Wendy Brown (1995) makes a similar kind of argument (in terms
of structure and implication) about the blind spots and ethnocentrisms
of human rights discourse.
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position), but race continues to function as it always has—
only the stronger, some might argue, for the constructionist
double-talk its least generous adherents can disingenuously
deploy. Karen Fields (2001) goes so far as to argue that
anthropologists have double standards when it comes to
race, challenging the rationality of what she calls “racecraft”
(the mystical and erroneous belief that race is simply biology) while allowing “witchcraft” its cultural/rational legitimacy as a counternarrative of causational possibility. According to Fields, this is a profound contradiction at the
core of the anthropological project, one that demands resolution. As others have made abundantly clear, using Stephan Palmié’s (2007) provocations as their lightening rod,
race (and its mobilization/recuperation in contemporary genomics) does not simply function analogously to witchcraft
within the contemporary intellectual moment. As just one
point of profound difference, it is deployed by many scientists and medical doctors today as a hypermaterialist/real
mechanism for treating sick patients and tracing historical
lineages, which exposes just some of deconstruction’s political insufficiencies.
Unlike discourses of “authenticity,” which seem to close
off critiques of identity politics at the limits of deconstruction,
“sincerity” provides a mechanism for asking how the deconstructed identity continues to powerfully/unfairly structure
people’s lives and life chances even after the emperor’s nakedness has been noted and reported ad infinitum. There is
something to be said for shifting the meta-anthropological
discussion from ethnographic authenticity to ethnographic
sincerity, but not as a plea for more truly sincere ethnographers. Our sincerities probably do us (and all of our many
ethnographic thems) more harm than good, but the point is
to ask what culling sociocultural knowledge through immersion-based participant observation might leave in its wake.
Those remainders help to refract the central riddle of the
anthropological puzzle: what makes humans human. They
also demand that we see our subjects as more than just informants, even more than just too-narrowly conceptualized
“political” actors, even if we cannot simplistically embrace
“friends” as an unselfconscious replacement.
In such a context, the ethnographic recognition of an uncanny emic-cum-etic humor is no smoking gun, because it
also implies a kind of nervous joke making, a laughing to
keep from talking—or to hide otherwise awkward silences.
(Lanita Jacobs-Huey [2008] writes about African American
comics and their responses to 9/11, one powerful distillation
of what comedic nervousness looks like in a contemporary
American context.) It may demand that the anthropologist
become a comedian himself, or that she study religious believers, as Marla Frederick (2003) might recommend, from
the inside out, as a believer herself—and not just from some
distant point of respectful exteriority, curiosity, and secular
alienation. Roxanne Varzi (2006) unfurls an Iranian landscape
that is very personal and intimate even as it attempts to write
about the possibilities of a future Islamic democracy. These
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researchers are offering up a critical and engaged anthropology that is much more than ideological cant and ethnocentric
hubris. For such scholar-activists, the personal is political—
not a personalized way out of the fray, but the only safe and
ethical space from which to fire off substantive ethnographic
salvos.
Many anthropologists call for a more relevant anthropology, for a renewed guildwide investment in the political implications of our efforts/offerings and for a greater appreciation of what can happen when cultural research and political
activism meet. To achieve this (and to utilize it most humanely), we must also think about all the many ways in which
the potential “political” of anthropological engagements necessitates more than just reductionism, more than abstracted
and disembodied Habermasian political figures haunting the
public sphere and ethnographic field site. The longing for a
postracial, asexual, and universal ethnographic researcher
privileges an apparition that unproductively occults the anthropological project. Indeed, our investments in ethnographic research/writing need not fall prey to that brand of
occultist evacuation (no matter how popular such aspirations
have become in the age of Obama). Paschal Randolph’s is
still an “occult public sphere,” but it fights for a sloppy and
irreducibly entified/somatic existence over abstract levelings
and emptyings of any kind. It demands to be taken seriously
and laughed at, productively, in the selfsame instant. We need
a notion of the political that is committed to the gunk of
ethnographic practice and that constructs an anthropology
that will not finesse its manipulations and machinations with
antiquatedly nonreflexive rhetoric about rapport as some kind
of mystical mind-melding, anthropological angels communicating without the noises and distractions (of, say, race and
gender/sex) caused by physical embodiment (Peters 1999).
This would be the beginning of a radically engaged (in every
sense of the term) anthropology disconnected from the reifications and dehumanizations that sometimes pass for politics all along the ideological spectrum. It could be an anthropology that better facilitates cultural critique and
collaborative action by way of the empathetic connections
that sharing a sincere laugh, even in the face of certain death,
implies.
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